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The measures which the Soviet Air Forces would take as hostilities became imminent are not part of the SAF doctrine. They are part of the mobilization plan of the military Chiefs of Staff. This plan is highly classified. Whenever the measures are to be applied, an attempt will be made to conceal Soviet intentions by alleged preparations for field training or maneuvers. Practically all of the measures would be applied within the territory of the USSR as well as in Eastern Germany. The exceptions would be those measures which are applicable only to occupational forces (examples: Evacuation of the families of Soviet officers, discharging of employees).

In the opinion of Soviet leaders and of SAF commanders, the correlation of air power between the Soviet and Western blocks must be in favor of the Soviets. This means that a superiority of air power must be obtained not only with

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respect to quantity but also, in quality. Qualitative superiority of air power includes not only better air materiel but also, superior aircrew training. When the Soviets have achieved this aim, the Soviet block will regard its position as superior to that of western air power and will be ready for war.

the following categories of targets are considered as being of prime importance:

- (a) Enemy airfields
- (b) enemy naval fleets and their bases,
- (c) enemy industrial centers.

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these three categories of targets would be attacked first in the event of hostilities. Of the many kinds of industrial targets, the following industries would be considered as being of prime importance: Aircraft, ship-building, atomic and hydrogen weapon manufacturing, chemical and munition plants.

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In tactical air operations, Soviet air commanders will consider the following factors in determining the locale or the targets against which the main blow of the SAF will be directed:

- (a) The situation of enemy ground forces (concentration, etc),
- (b) Concentration of enemy air forces at airfields close to a given front,
- (c) The state of transportation nets,
- (d) Concentration of military forces and their technical supplies,
- (e) The question of morale among enemy troops,
- (f) Combat supplies' storage
- (g) Military importance of the territory occupied by the enemy.

All of these factors influence the direction of the main air blow which is to support the defensive or offensive operations of the Soviet ground forces. Also, Soviet air doctrine recognizes the tactic of carrying out intensive raids in different locations in order to confuse the enemy as to the direction of the main attack which is to be executed by the ground forces.

In strategic air warfare, Soviet Long Range Aviation will concentrate on destroying the enemy's war potential. Such targets might include aircraft factories, factories making other war materiel, air bases and shipping facilities. The selection of the primary target will depend on which part of the enemy's war potential is most injurious to the Soviets.

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In the opinion of SAF commanders, the SAF will play a very important role in a future war in Western Europe. The success of Soviet ground forces will depend fully on the SAF. In addition to the mission of destroying enemy troops and materiel at the front, the SAF will have the broad task of reducing the enemy's defensive capabilities by carrying out bomber raids on enemy military, industrial, economic and political centers. Likewise, the SAF will have a very important role in the air defense of the USSR and of the Soviet armed forces.

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Soviet air doctrine places more emphasis on massive attacks coupled with the element of surprise and continuity. Very little attention has been devoted to the rapier-like threats of limited aircraft strength because they are regarded as unlikely to be successful in executing an assigned mission.

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SAF doctrines in respect to the use of mass aviation in an air attack were published in the SAF Operational Regulations of 1948 (BUAV-48), and in a number of Informational Bulletins of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy and of the Military Air Force Academy. These documents stated that mass air attacks may be carried out in various strengths beginning with an air division. Massive air attacks can be carried out either by combined types of aircraft (bomber, fighter, ground attack) or by units of one of these aircraft types. The strength of mass air attacks will depend on the importance of the target and its air defenses.

The propaganda of the Communist Party has had a great influence on SAF doctrine, including the question of annihilating the enemy. Communist Party propaganda endeavors continuously to increase the hatred of SAF personnel for the enemy. This is achieved by presenting unfavorable views of the enemy. For example, SAF personnel are constantly told that the enemy is making intensive preparations for war against the USSR. At political lectures various facets of the activities of the western powers are discussed in such a manner as to make this proposition sound most reasonable.

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The success of Communist Party propaganda in this respect is underestimated by the western powers. Almost every Soviet soldier and almost every member of the SAF honestly believes that the western powers are preparing for an attack on the USSR. Then too, Communism affects SAF doctrine through another channel: SAF commanders are Communist Party members and act in accordance with the Party line.

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The German Blitzkrieg theory had a profound influence on Soviet air doctrine. It was because of the German Blitzkrieg at the outset of the Russian-German conflict that Soviet Ground Attack Aviation was established in 1942. The idea of providing the ground forces with concentrated, massive ground support was conceived only because the German Blitzkrieg tactics proved very effective.

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Soviet air doctrine, relative to seizing the initiative in air warfare, is based on the assumption that superiority in the air can only be gained by superior fighter aircraft and better trained fighter pilots. Numerical aircraft superiority is also considered an important part of Soviet air doctrine.

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In the years immediately after the close of World War II, the SAF placed its greatest emphasis on the development of fighter aviation. Less attention was paid to bomber aviation. It was in this period that the SAF went through the phase of weeding out unsatisfactory personnel and building more efficient cadres. This selection of personnel was completed before the units were furnished with new equipment.

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By 1949, the SAF was placing still greater emphasis on its fighter aviation, and more attention was being devoted to bomber aviation than in the early post-war period. This was evidenced at this time by the taking of special measures to improve the combat proficiency of the post-war SAF cadres:

- (a) The limitations on the consumption of aviation gasoline for training purposes were lifted;
- (b) greater control over the conduct of combat training was effected;
- (c) more concern was shown about the needs of flying personnel;
- (d) tours of individual units by staff officers from SAF Headquarters became more frequent

For example, the 175th Fighter Division was re-equipped with jet aircraft towards the end of 1949. In February, 1950 the Commanding General of the SAF, P F Zhigarev, paid a personal visit to this division in order to observe the progress of training with new jet aircraft. At this time he declared that: "From now on this division can consume as much gasoline as is deemed necessary for training operations". Gen Zhigarev personally conversed with the flying personnel of the division in order to find out what their problems were. Subsequently, various specialists from the main headquarters conducted classes on various technical subjects in the division in an effort to increase the effectiveness of combat training. Similar activities also took place in units of Long Range Aviation. the new emphasis on bomber aviation in conversations with officers from bomber units. The SAF began to build new airfields for Long Range Aviation in the Far East and in the northern regions of the

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Soviet Union.

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The MIG-15 is a universal frontal aviation fighter aircraft and, until it is replaced by a better aircraft, it will continue to function as such. It might function as a bomber-escort, as an interceptor of enemy bombers or fighters or, as a ground support aircraft for aiding the ground forces.

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The advantages of the element of surprise are fully appreciated in the SAF. Surprise is considered one of the most important elements in the launching of a successful air offensive.

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The SAF doctrine with respect to the tempo of air warfare offensive is along the following lines: An air offensive must be carried out (a) quickly enough to gain the advantage of surprise, (b) in sufficient strength to assure maximum destruction to the enemy and (c) the offensive has to be sustained long enough to prevent the enemy from organizing an effective defense. In tactical operations, air offensive is closely tied in with preparatory artillery bombardment and the advance of the ground forces.

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The Soviet post-1945 air doctrine states that in order to sustain an effective air offensive, the air commander must plan his attack with utmost precision and be particularly specific when issuing orders to his subordinate units. The attack must be organized and coordinated with the greatest care so that all participating units will cooperate in achieving mutual success. Preparation of all participating units, down to the smallest aircrew, is considered one of the most important elements in assuring the success of an air offensive.

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Except for minor details, SAF doctrine respecting the counter-offensive did not change after 1945. The exceptions to this rule were so minor that they did not make a lasting impression.

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The following factors govern the selection of the direction and the strength of an air counter-offensive:

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- (a) Knowledge of enemy intentions to launch an air offensive;
- (b) intelligence pin-pointing of the concentration of the enemy's main forces designated for the offensive;
- (c) disclosure by intelligence of the enemy's main supply route;
- (d) knowledge of the location of the enemy's network of airfields at a particular war front;
- (e) knowledge of the enemy's vulnerability, ie, where enemy vital points may be destroyed with the effect of forcing the enemy to abandon his intentions of an offensive.

The moment the enemy ends his attack or indicates a desire to break off the engagement, is considered a suitable point for transition from active defense to counter-offense. In other words, Soviet air doctrine emphasizes that a propitious time for launching a counter-offensive is when enemy air power loses the initiative.

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Air interdiction has been and continues to be a very important part of SAF tactics. To the best of my knowledge, the SAF has not modified its theories with respect to air interdiction since 1945.

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The SAF Command will use subversive elements in enemy territory for such purposes as sabotage or signalling friendly bombers towards the target. Of this there can be no doubt.

The SAF takes chemical warfare very seriously now. Up to 1949 little attention was given to CW and the personnel assigned to it were performing other duties which had nothing in common with CW problems. The chemical warfare leaders of the SAF say that the Soviet Union is not preparing to initiate chemical warfare in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. They do say, however, that they must be ready to retaliate in kind in the event the enemy starts chemical warfare. For this reason, beginning in 1949, the SAF high command stepped up its chemical warfare training and relieved chemical warfare personnel from all other duties.

All-weather and night flying is the most important element of SAF training. The following examples will prove this contention: The Commanding General of the VVS, P F Zhigarev, visited the 175th Fighter Division in February, 1950. At this time, Gen Zhigarev stressed all-weather and night flying and declared it would be henceforth a very important part of the training program. Likewise, the Commander of the 71st Fighter Corps, Colonel Amulenko, demanded that division commanders step up all-weather, day and night flight training. The trend of SAF thinking is that all-weather flying will be a very important factor in any future wars.

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In SAF doctrine, air reconnaissance is considered important to both the missions of the SAF and of the Soviet ground forces. Serious attention has been given to air reconnaissance since 1946 when each air division designated one squadron for the specific purpose of conducting night and day reconnaissance. The task of the reconnaissance squadron is to collect information of interest to both the SAF and the ground forces. Each reconnaissance crew is specifically instructed to be constantly alert and to be very observant while over enemy territory.

The SAF doctrine provides that each commander of an air force unit must hold sufficient force in reserve to cope with an unexpected eventuality. This means that the commander of a fighter air division, for example, must never send up his entire division, but should hold one or two regiments in reserve. When it becomes necessary to use the entire force of an air division, the corps commander will of necessity designate some of his reserves and make them available to the division commander in question. Generally speaking, SAF doctrine with respect to the commitment of reserves is controlled by the enemy's reserve doctrine. In other words, the SAF Commander's reserve policies are flexible enough to fit in with the actions of the enemy.

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